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Introduction
In most developed economies, the attention given to competition policy in the political agenda has increased substantially over the last two decades. While a number of antitrust jurisdictions exhibit long-standing commitments to antitrust principles (e.g., the US, Germany & the EU), other developed economies (particularly small economies that traditionally relied on trade policy to discipline markets) have recently introduced or substantially enhanced preexisting competition policies (OECD, 2008; Boner and Krueger, 1991) . Accordingly, we witness developments in support of these objectives: the introduction of new competition laws to formally change the institutional environment for antitrust enforcement (Palim, 1998) ; and the introduction of new competition authorities to enforce these laws (e.g., Portugal's PCA, and the Dutch NMa). In short, the last two decades appear to have experienced a number of substantial changes to the competition policies of many nations.
Despite observations of significant change across nations, we have surprisingly little quantitative empirical evidence on the state of competition policy in the cross-national context. A number of studies certainly attempt to survey the developments in cross-national competition policy (e.g., Boner and Krueger, 1991; Doern and Wilks, 1996; Röller, Stennek, and Verboven, 2000) , but these studies rely exclusively on expert opinion and comparative case analysis.
1 Instead, the majority of quantitative empirical work on competition policy appears to be embedded in one antitrust jurisdiction -that nation often being the US. 2 The scarcity of hard empirical evidence is in part driven by the severe data limitations with regard to analyzing one nation's competition policy (Horn and Levinsohn, 2001 )-such problems are 1 Palim's (1998) empirical analysis of cross-national competition laws, the assessment by Dutz and Vagliasindi (2000) of the impact of transition nation's competition policy on firm mobility, and the consideration of how different commitments to competition policy impact TFP growth (Voigt, 2006 , Buccirossi et al., 2009 ) represent exceptions to this point. 2 Quantitative empirical work on US competition policy includes: Kwoka, 1999; Ghosal, 2002; Clougherty, 2005; Clougherty and Zhang, 2005 . Quantitative empirical work on EU competition policy includes : Bergman, Jakobsson and Razo, 2003; Duso, Neven and Röller, 2007; Neven, Papandropoulos, and Seabright, 1998 . Quantitative empirical work on German and Norwegian competition policy respectively includes: Lauk, 2002; and Nilssen, 1997. of course compounded when one seeks to measure the competition policies in multiple nations.
Despite the stated difficulties, I aim to go beyond the case of a single antitrust jurisdiction and employ quantitative empirical evidence to analyze the cross-national environment for competition policy. In order to do so, I have compiled a unique data set that allows comparing experiences and trends across antitrust jurisdictions over the [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] period. While a number of inquiry areas come to mind when considering how economic analysis can contribute to an improved knowledge about the state of cross-national competition policy, the data more readily allow analysing two particular areas of interest: 1) the detection of broad trends in competition policy and practice over the period of study; 2) the impact of competition policy on economic growth. The first area of interest is motivated by the fact that a great deal of the received wisdom regarding competition policy has not been empirically tested: in short, there are far too many 'perceived' stylized facts out there. The second area of interest is guided by the perspective that competition policy can act as an intermediate input in to the economy: a facilitating device that promotes economic growth via the competitiveness of industry and firms.
The paper is organized as follows in order to support the analysis. Since the novelty of providing empirical evidence on the cross-national context for competition policy represents one of the defining features of this analysis, the next section describes the primary data in detail. The third section presents descriptive empirical analysis of trends in the cross-national environment for competition policy. The fourth section presents empirical analysis of how competition policy might impact economic growth. The fifth section concludes.
The Data
The actual data consist of annual measures of competition policy for 32 antitrust jurisdictions over the 1992-2007 period. The OECD directs members and associates to respond to specific questions in order to generate annual reports on the state of competition policy in those jurisdictions. Thus, the OECD's annual reports on 'Competition Policy in OECD Countries' provide raw data on cross-national competition policies that can be compiled into empirical measures. While the OECD reports are the main source of data for this study, additional data were gathered via direct contact with -and specific reports fromactual antitrust authorities in order to fill any data holes and reconcile any incompatibilities.
The overriding concern in data compilation was to create consistently accurate measures of national competition policies. In doing so, the data are necessarily characterized as unbalanced panels-as a number of annual observations were missing or necessarily dropped in order to yield consistent cross-jurisdiction/cross-time measures.
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The actual empirical constructs concerning competition policy fall into two categories:
overall resources and merger work-load. First, I have three measures concerning the resources which antitrust authorities can bring to bear in undertaking competition policies: 'AntitrustBudget' refers to the yearly budget -measured in constant purchasing power parity (PPP) dollars -upon which the authority(s) can conduct competition policy. 'Economists' refers to the number of trained economists the authority(s) has in order to engage in competition policy analysis. 'Lawyers' refers to the number of trained lawyers the authority(s) has in order to engage in competition policy legal analysis and litigation. 4 Second, I have one measure concerning the merger policy work-load faced by antitrust authorities: 'Notified Transactions' refers to the annual number of transactions (mergers, acquisitions and alliances) that are notified in the antitrust jurisdiction. Unfortunately, I do not have data concerning the nonmerger related workload (e.g., abuse-of-dominance and collusion cases) faced by antitrust authorities.
3 See Clougherty (2005) and Seldeslachts, Clougherty and Barros (2009) for papers that also employ OECD data while studying the cross-national context for competition policy. 4 Note that 'Economists' and 'Lawyers' refers to the profession of the employee but not the training, thus we have no data, for example, on whether the Economists have attained a PhD or not. 2) are the increases in antitrust budgets commensurate with enhanced antitrust workloads; 3)
is the role of economics (economists) ascendant relative to law (lawyers) over the period of study? The evidence above contradicts Kwoka's (1999) finding that US antitrust financial resources in the 1990s fell short of the antitrust needs during that period. This finding is line with the idea that the cross-national environment for competition policy exhibits a strengthening in policy -reflected in strong financial commitments -over the last few decades that out strips the marginal commitments to US antitrust policy. It should be pointed out, however, that cross-national antitrust authorities have other competition policy concerns (e.g., controlling collusion and anti-competitive behaviour) that will often be put on hold suggests that cross-national antitrust jurisdictions were indeed able to properly vet the merger wave of the mid-to-late 1990s, and moreover were potentially engaging in increasingly stringent merger policy over the period of study. 5 It should be pointed out that a number of authorities underwent changes to their merger notifications' procedures over this time period that generally increased merger notification thresholds. Accordingly, the upward trend witnessed in Figure 2 may actually be indicating that the merger authorities are simply better able to 'separate the wheat from the chaff' under the new threshold procedures. Unfortunately, virtually every authority incurred at least one change in notification threshold during the period of study, thus it does not make *** put Figure 2 near here *** Another important trend that has been suggested to be present in recent years is the increased role of economic analysis in shaping competition policy and antitrust enforcement.
Enhanced competition policy is in part the direct result of large-scale deregulation of many industries in the cross-national environment. As with regulatory policy -where economic ideas (and economists) were ascendant relative to legalistic ideas (see Derthick and Quirk, 1985; Winston, 1993 ) -the expectation would be for economic ideas, analysis and people to be ascendant in the realm of competition policy over the last decade relative to legal ideas, analysis and people. Although an imperfect indicator, I take the ratio of economists to lawyers working for an antitrust jurisdiction as a proxy for this effect. Figure 3 presents the ratio of economists to lawyers for All-Authorities and for the Big-5 authorities. 6 The figure illustrates that for the All-Authorities sample, the ratio of economists to lawyers first increased (in 1993 there were some .42 economists for every lawyer, but by 1998 there were .74 economists for sense to sub-sample the data and report equivalent figures for both authorities with and without threshold changes. The same applies for Figure 1 . 6 The yearly ratio of economists to lawyers was created not by taking the average of the cross-national ratios, but instead by summing up all the economists and all the lawyers working for all authorities (or the Big 5 authorities) and then taking the ratio of that sum. Accordingly, the reported ratios are weighted by the various antitrust jurisdictions' staff sizes.
In concluding, recall that three questions motivated the analysis here of trends in the cross-national environment for competition policy: 1) how does growth in antitrust budgets compare to economic growth; 2) are the increases in antitrust budgets commensurate with increases in antitrust workload; 3) is the role of economics (economists) ascendant relative to law (lawyers) over the period of study? I found evidence in support of the following over the 1992-2007 period: (1 st ) antitrust budgets have been growing much more robustly than the national economies in this sample; (2 nd ) antitrust budgets appear to have increased in line with the increased workload for antitrust authorities, and antitrust authorities appear to have been able to properly vet the merger wave of the 1990s; (3 rd ) the role of economics -at least as measured by the ratio of economists to lawyers -does not appear to be substantially increasing over this study period for experienced authorities, however less-experienced authorities indicate an upward trend in the role of economics followed by a downward trend.
Competition Policy & Growth
Following the above analysis of trends in competition policy, the most natural question is what economic benefits nations receive with respect to investing in competition policy. For instance, the influence of a variety of public policies (e.g., monetary, fiscal, labour, regulatory, and trade) on economic growth has been a question of particular interest for both economic researchers and government officials. Ahn and Hemmings (2000) provide an excellent review of the vast literature on the policy determinants of economic growth, and observe that "the efficiency of markets for goods and services and the incentives for innovation created by competition policy and other regulatory frameworks potentially have an important influence on growth" (p. 44). Consider also the theoretical work -e.g., Porter (1990) , and Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey (1999) -that sets conditions for when domestic competition can enhance the effort of firms and thereby enhance economic growth. In line with the proposition that intense competition breeds growth, the relationship between international trade openness and economic growth has been widely investigated for empirical regularities (Ahn and Hemmings, 2000) . Further, the relationship between regulatory policy and economic growth has received increased interest by empiricists (e.g., Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2003) .
Surprisingly, however, very little literature exists concerning the impact of competition policy on economy-wide growth. In fact, Dutz and Hayri (1999) represents the only study I was able to identify concerning competition policy and economic growth; though, Voigt (2006) and Buccirossi et al. (2009) life-expectancy to proxy human capital, Ahn and Hemmings (2000) note that schooling-levels have also been used in order to tease out cross-country human capital differences.
Accordingly, I employ the percentage of the national population between 25 and 64 attaining a tertiary -i.e., higher -education level to proxy for human capital (hereafter referred to as Human-Capital), but are mindful of its deficiencies.
Fourth, a substantial amount of literature suggests-as previously noted-that tradeopenness fundamentally affects economic growth (e.g., Hoeller, Girouard and Colecchia, 1998; Ahn and Hemmings, 2000) . Accordingly, I include exports as a percentage of GDP (hereafter Openness) to measure the impact of a nation being open to the world trade system.
Fifth, population growth has also been found to negatively impact growth rates. The negative relationship between population and economic growth reflects a number of mechanisms: the strongest evidence suggesting that population growth involves an increasing dependency ratio that dampens growth in GDP per capita. Accordingly, I include the annual rate of population growth (hereafter Population-Growth) to capture this effect.
Sixth, the inflation rate for the economy is also included as a control variable, as high inflation has been generally found to be damaging for long-run economic growth. National macroeconomic policies often attempt to reduce inflation due to a variety of perceived benefits from such actions: 1) ensuring that the damaging effects of hyper-inflation are not experienced: 2) mitigating the uncertainty that comes with inflation; 3) minimizing any relative price distortions in the domestic market; 4) enhancing the credibility of monetary policy (Ahn and Hemmings, 2000) . Accordingly, the annual inflation rate for a national economy (hereafter Inflation) is controlled for.
As already alluded to above, I must control for an additional construct: the general effectiveness of a nation's political institutions. Voigt (2006) 
Estimation Issues
The discussion above identified the six core explanatory constructs found in the economic growth literature, the additional government effectiveness issue per Voigt (2006) , and the measures I was able to gather in order to capture those effects. It is also important to identify the two constructs of primary interest here: i.e., the relationship between economicgrowth and competition-policy. The standard dependent variable for empirical work on growth is the percentage change in real per-capita GDP. Hence, I adopt the yearly percent change in real per-capita GDP measured in PPP terms as the dependent variable (hereafter referred to as Growth). The explanatory variable of principal interest is a nation's commitment to competition policy. As already noted, I use the annual budgetary resourcesmeasured in PPP terms -devoted to competition policy, as a measure of the commitment to competition policy (referred to as Antitrust-Budget).
The actual data employed for the estimated growth model consist-at the most detailed level of abstraction-of annual measures for twenty-five national antitrust jurisdictions over the 1996-2007 period. 8 Properly analyzing the data, however, requires the 8 The EU and six of the national antitrust jurisdictions from Table 2 (Austria, Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Italy, and Portugal) were dropped from this analysis as they had more than seven observations missing for the variable of key interest. Further, the data on government effectiveness only extends from 1996-2007; hence, the regressions based on annual observations span the 1996-2007 period and do not include observations on years prior to 1996. Since Voigt's (2006) work is so clear on this point, including the Government-Effectiveness variable appears to be worth the sacrifice in observation numbers.
consideration of a few econometric issues: level-of-analysis for observations; choice between fixed and random effects; and the appropriateness of period effects.
First, the custom for empirical work on economic growth is to average growth over a ten to twenty year period in order to smooth out any business cycle effects and then estimate cross-sectional (i.e., cross-national) models. In that vein, Fölster and Henrekson (1999) growth. When adopting a yearly level-of-analysis, however, it becomes imperative to control for both the annual inflation rate -already noted above as a control variable -and the annual unemployment rate in the labour force (hereafter referred to as Unemployment). In short, macroeconomic variables, e.g., inflation and unemployment, must be included as control variables in order to partially capture the business cycle and mitigate mistiming and measurement-error problems.
Second, estimating panel data regression models often implies a choice between a fixed-effects specification and a random-effects specification. The relatively small degrees-offreedom (only 42 observations for the panel treatments with five-year averages) available favours the adoption of random effects. Greene (1990) Third, a number of potential changes have occurred in the cross-national environment for antitrust and economic growth over the 1992-2007 period-changes that create timespecific data trends, affect inferences, and call for the addition of period-effects. For example, the addition of period effects helps control for macroeconomic trends that affect yearly growth in all nations; thus, partially addressing the concerns noted above vis-à-vis business cycles.
The six reported regression equations in Table 3 take the above econometric concerns into account. The first three regressions use the full variation involved with annual observations by keeping the unit of analysis at the country-year. The second three regressions take five-year averages of the various constructs for each country -in keeping with the growth literature (e.g., Kneller, Bleaney and Gemmell, 1999; Fölster and Henrekson, 2001 ) -thus the temporal unit of analysis consists of three periods: averages for 1993-1997, 1998-2002, and 2003-2007. 9 Furthermore, I report a basic OLS specification, a random-effects specification, and a fixed-effects specification -with the OLS and random-effects specifications representing good robustness checks for the fixed-effects results. Furthermore, a fixed period-specific effect is included in all six regressions.
Since the fixed-effects specification is both econometrically-conservative and readilyexpressible, it is represented here: 
Empirical Results
As already mentioned, Table 3 reports the estimation results for the six regression models. It is important that the regression models be reasonably well-specified and behave in accordance with prior theory and empirical work in order to be reasonably confident regarding inferences concerning the competition-policy/economic-growth relationship. While the models appear to yield results that are generally consistent with expectations, the following analysis takes a variable-by-variable approach to ensure that the control variables conform with both prediction and previous empirical growth work.
• The coefficient estimate for Per-Capita-GDP (the convergence effect) is negative and statistically significant in five of the six regression models. This conforms to expectation and with the economic growth literature: nations with higher levels of income generally grow slower than do nations with lower levels of income.
• The coefficient estimate for Physical-Capital is positive and significant as expected in the first three regression models (where annual data is employed); though, insignificant in the last three regression models (where 5-year average data is employed). Accordingly, the estimations yield some evidence in support of the prediction that investments in physical-capital generate positive economic growth.
• The coefficient estimate for Human-Capital is insignificant in all the regression models except for #6-and there it is negative. The lack of conformance with prediction may owe to the deficiencies of the proxy used for Human-Capital: tertiary education attainment. It stands to reason that this measure will not vary considerably for a nation over a fifteen year period; thus, its' poor performance does make intuitive sense.
• The coefficient estimate for Openness is positive and significant as expected in all six regression models: the positive impact of Openness on Growth appears to be the most statistically robust control effect in the estimation treatments.
• The coefficient estimate for Population-Growth is insignificant in all six regression models. Accordingly, the estimations yield little evidence in support of the prediction that population growth leads to negative economic growth.
• The coefficient estimates for Inflation are negative and significant in the first five regression models, thus conforming to prediction that inflation reduces economic growth.
• The coefficient estimates for Unemployment are insignificant in all of the regression models.
• Finally, the coefficient-estimates for Government-Effectiveness are positive and significant in regression models' #2, #3 & #6; thus, lending some support to the literature on general institutional quality setting the conditions for economic growth.
In sum the eight control variables do not perform perfectly, but they are reasonably consistent with a priori expectations and the existing empirical literature on economic growth. Accordingly, we should infer a degree of confidence that the regression models are relatively well specified and thus allow inferences regarding the relationship of primary concern: competition-policy and economic-growth. Turning now to the explanatory variable of principal concern, the coefficient estimates for Antitrust-Budget is positive and significant in all six regression models. Accordingly, the estimations yield evidence in support of the prediction that commitments to competition policy correlate with positive economic growth.
As already noted, Regression #3 (the fixed-effects estimation with annual observations) could be considered the more econometrically conservative estimation technique; hence, further interpreting that coefficient estimate (14.31) for economic significance involves merit. The coefficient estimate suggests that an increase to the mean level of competition policy funding in the sample by one standard-deviation ($58.8 million)
would result in increased economic growth by 0.84 percentage points on average. million on average) suggests that British economic growth -holding other things constantwould be some 0.14 percentage points higher than that in France due to its higher commitment to competition policy. Second, in terms of competition-policy being an important factor in what drives overall economic growth in a national economy: I found supportive evidence that competition policy (or at least a nation's budgetary commitment to competition policy) plays a positive role in economic growth. The empirical tests here are not definitive, but they do suggest that competition policy is yet another public policy that could have some explanatory power when it comes to defining the source of economic wealth. 
Conclusion

